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In the case of natural monopolies there tends to be a trade-o⁄between a higher quality of
output provided by private ￿rms, and a better access for poor consumers provided by public
￿rms. This is partly the re￿ ection of di⁄erences in objectives by private and public ￿rms. The
former tend to be pro￿t-driven, whereas the latter tend to base decisions on political agendas
(Chong and Lopez de Silanes, 2005). The objective of this paper is to explore the impact
on network access, water quality, and health outcomes of Uruguay￿ s nationalization of water
services. An important advantage of focusing on nationalization rather than privatization
is that it avoids selection bias due to cherry-picking by ￿rms or governments at the time
of privatization. Indeed, nationalization in Uruguay a⁄ected all previously privatized ￿rms,
as water was declared ￿part of the public domain￿ . Results suggest that the change in
ownership led to an increase in the sanitation rate, as well as improvements in water quality.
It was also accompanied by a decline in water-related child mortality, although this latter
e⁄ect tends not to be statistically signi￿cant across speci￿cations.
JEL: D60, H51, I10, I30, L33, O12
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Resumen
En el caso de monopolios naturales tiende a existir un trade o⁄entre mayor calidad de las
empresas privadas y un mejor acceso de las empresas pœblicas. Esto es debido parcialmente
a las diferencias de objetivos de ambos tipos de empresas. Las empresas privadas estÆn
orientadas hac￿a los bene￿cios y las pœblicas se basan en un a agenda de pol￿tica (Chong and
Lopez de Silanes, 2005). Este estudio analiza el impacto en saneamiento, calidad del agua
y salud de la nacionalizaci￿n de los servicios de agua en Uruguay. Los resultados sugieren
que el cambio en la propiedad condujo a un aumento en la tasa de saneamiento y mejoras
en la calidad del agua. Una importante ventaja de focalizarse en la nacionalizaci￿n y no en
la privatizaci￿n es evitar los temas de selecci￿n debido a que los gobiernos eligen las mejores
empresas al privatizar.
JEL: D60, H51, I10, I30, L33, O12
Palabras claves: nacionalizaci￿n, saneamiento, calidad del agua, mortalidad infantil1 Introduction
Back in the 1970s the role of the government as provider of basic services in sectors with a
natural monopoly component, such as water supply and sanitation, was hardly questioned.
Indeed, it was thought that private ￿rms were likely to abuse their monopoly power in
this type of markets, and concentrate their service supply on rich households, leaving poor
households without access to a basic service.1 On the other hand, public companies, because
they often tend to be partly driven by a political agenda, would have incentives to ensure
access to a maximum of potential voters (at least in democracies).
By the late 1980s the weak economic performance and low productivity of many public
companies around the world changed this view (World Bank, 2004). Bad management
practices, due to political agendas rather than pro￿t-oriented motives, shed light on large
ine¢ ciencies and poor quality of services being provided by these public companies. In
the 1990s, privatization of water services was seen by some as a potential solution to the
poor performance of publicly owned water monopolies that left more than 1 billion people
in developing countries without any access to clean and safe water, and 40 percent of the
world￿ s population without access to safe and clean sanitation services (Seger￿ edt, 2005).
UNDP in its Human Development Report of 2006 notes that ￿not having access to water and
sanitation is a polite euphemism for a form of deprivation that threatens life.￿ And Galiani
et al. (2005) provide empirical evidence that a move towards privatization of water services
in Argentina in the 1990s led to a faster decline in child mortality.
France was an early example of a country with privately provided water services. And
throughout the 1990s many countries engaged in privatization of water services, starting
with England in 1989, followed by Eastern European and Latin American countries. A few
Asian and African countries followed them in the mid and late 1990s (Hall et al. 2010).
Nevertheless, the share of public water companies is still very large.2 Moreover, it has
1In September 2010, the United Nation￿ s Human Rights￿ Council adopted Resolution 64/292 which
declares access to water and sanitation a human right.
2According to Hall et al. (2010) water services are owned and run by the public sector in 90% of the
largest 400 cities in the world. This ￿gure should be compared to the share of formal employment in public
companies across all sectors, which is on average 5 percent according to Kikeri (1999).
1increased in the last ten years as backlashes to privatization occurred in many countries.
Uruguay is a recent example of this reversal. An amendment to the Uruguayan
constitution was passed in 2004 declaring water as ￿part of the public domain￿ . The private
provision of water was made illegal.3 This led to the nationalization of two water and sewage
suppliers in the Department of Maldonado that were privatized in 1993 and 2000. The private
water companies that operated in the Department of Canelones since the 1940s also came
under the control of the public monopoly.
The apparent reasons for Uruguay￿ s nationalization of water companies were no di⁄erent
from the ones observed in other Latin American countries in the last decade (Bolivia,
Argentina, Brazil, etc). Privatization of water services did not deliver on its promises.4
Private companies became deeply unpopular due to perceptions, at least, of low or falling
quality of water, as well as the high prices private companies charged. A series of highly
publicized episodes of low quality water supplied by Uragua and Aguas de la Costa
(subsidiaries of the Spanish water companies Aguas de Barcelona and Aquas de Bilbao)
led as early as 2003 (in the middle of a ￿nancial crisis) to an also well publicized request by
the then Minister of Economics and Finance, Alejandro Atchugarry, for Uragua to leave the
country.
Whether public or private provision of water leads to better access, quality and health
outcomes is an empirical question. The objective of this paper is to explore the impact
that the nationalization of water services had on the quality of water (microbiological
and inorganic tests) and access to sanitation networks (percentage of households with
water-sealed toilets connected to sewer lines) in Uruguay, as well as on an important health
outcome: child mortality. The study of Uruguay￿ s nationalization episode is interesting
because it avoids the inherently selection bias associated with cherry-picking when looking
at privatization. Indeed, nationalization a⁄ected all companies as private provision of water
was made illegal. Thus, as long as the determinants of the decision to privatize are not
serially correlated we would have a reliable identi￿cation strategy. Second, household access
3In the Netherlands water privatization was also made illegal.
4The reason for the failure of privatization is not necessarily inherent to privatization, but may also be
explained by poorly designed contracts (in terms of required investments) or non-adequate regulatory bodies.
These are also often associated with problems of corruption (see Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2005).
2to Uruguay￿ s piped sewerage network remains particularly low for countries at similar levels
of development. The access rate below 50 percent compares badly with other Latin American
countries such as Chile, Colombia, Mexico and some comparable Brazilian states in terms
of income per capita.
The existing empirical evidence on the impact of privatization on water quality, access
and child mortality tends to suggest a positive impact, although there are a few studies
suggesting otherwise. Wallsten and Kosec (2005) analyze the e⁄ect of water ownership on
water quality, measured as the number of violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
in the US between 1997 and 2003. Using panel data at the community level, and controlling
for community ￿xed e⁄ects, they ￿nd that ownership does not matter in terms of compliance
with the SDWA. This may be due to the fact that the study is undertaken in a developed
country with high levels of income and therefore a strong demand for high quality water.5
In a developing country study, Barrera-Osorio et al. (2009) using a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
methodology assess the impact of water privatization in Colombia on several outcomes like
coverage (percentage of households connected to water service) and water quality (frequency
of the service and aspect of water, such as its color). They ￿nd that, in urban areas, water
access increases and that water quality improves as a result of privatization, while negative
e⁄ects on access where detected in rural areas. This is consistent with the idea that as water
services are privatized the poorest consumers may be the ones left behind.
Regarding the impact on child mortality, Shi (2000) ￿nds a positive e⁄ect of private
provision of water on child mortality using a cross city model. However, problems of
selection bias and endogeneity were di¢ cult to address in a cross section setup. Using
a panel data setup, Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2005) provide convincing evidence
that in Argentinean municipalities where water services were privatized, the incidence of child
mortality from water-related diseases declined signi￿cantly (whereas the incidence of child
mortality for other reasons remained stagnant). They therefore provide indirect evidence of
improvements in water quality and access. Note, however, that the same critiques towards
private water suppliers that were present in Uruguay in the late 1990s and early 2000s were
5In their review of the literature Nauges and D. Whittington (2009) suggest that income elasticities of
demand oscillate between 0.1 and 0.4.
3present also in the Argentinean press at the time (high prices, water provided by private
companies being un￿t for human consumption, or the fact that these private companies only
honor half of their investment commitments). Galdo and Bertha (2005) also found that
water access had positive e⁄ects on child mortality in Brazil and Ecuador.
The empirical methodology we followed is similar to the one in Galiani, Gertler, and
Schargrodosky (2005). Using panel data around the nationalization episode, we identify
di⁄erences in sanitation rate, water quality indicators and water-related child mortality
between regions that ￿rst privatized their water suppliers, and later nationalized them, and
those that did not using a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimator.
Our results suggest that the nationalization of water services had a positive and
statistically signi￿cant impact on access to the sanitation network, in particular among
household in the bottom 25 percent of the income distribution. At the top of the income
distribution, only households in Maldonado seemed to experience an increase in access to
the sanitation network. But even in Maldonado the impact of nationalization is clearly
pro-poor with a larger impact on poor households (coe¢ cients tend to be 2 times larger and
statistically di⁄erent from the coe¢ cient in the rich household sub-sample).
Nationalization seemed to have led to higher quality of water as well. Indeed, the impact
of nationalization on the detection of abnormal levels in microbiological and inorganic water
tests is always negative and has a relatively large coe¢ cient, suggesting that nationalization
led to an improvement of water quality.
Finally, our di⁄erent speci￿cations tend to suggest that water nationalization had little
impact on child mortality, even when we disentangle water and non-water related diseases.
Indeed, in most cases the coe¢ cients on nationalization of water services is not statistically
di⁄erent from zero, even though in most cases it has a negative sign, suggesting that child
mortality declined after nationalization.
To summarize, the nationalization of water services in Uruguay suggests that the public
sector can do it as well or better than the private sector. This goes against most of the
existing evidence for developing countries that generally shows that privatization leads to
higher levels of sewerage access and water quality, as well as lower levels of child mortality.
4This could be partly explained by a badly implemented privatization in Uruguay that was
not accompanied by adequate regulation and institutions. Also, it is possible that Uruguay￿ s
public company is more e¢ cient in terms of access, water quality and public health objectives
than public water companies in other countries. Overall, the empirical results in this paper
suggest that privatization is not the silver bullet that could lead the way towards better
access to clean and safe water.6
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the functioning of
the water system in Uruguay. Section 3 discuses the empirical methodology, and Section 4
presents the data and some descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the results, and section
6 concludes.
2 The Water System in Uruguay
At the turn of this century water and sewage service in Uruguay were provided by ￿fteen
private companies and a publicly-owned company called OSE (Obras Sanitarias del Estado).
OSE had an exclusive monopoly in water provision in Montevideo (Uruguay￿ s capital city)
and almost all of the national territory accounting for more than 90% of the connections. The
private sector was basically composed of three big companies (Uragua, Aguas Corrientes El
Pinar, and Aguas de la Costa) and approximately twelve water providers with less than 500
connections each. These small providers were cooperatives founded by residents to provide
water services in areas that OSE was not reaching or was reaching with poor quality water.
Uragua started to provide water and sewage service in urban and sub-urban areas of
Maldonado in 2000. Maldonado has 150,000 inhabitants of a total of 3,300,000 in Uruguay.
Uragua served the west of the Maldonado stream with the exception of the city of AiguÆ.
More speci￿cally, Uragua served the capital of Maldonado (50,417 inhabitants), San Carlos
(23,878), Pan de Azœcar (6,969), PiriÆpolis (7,579), Cerros Azules, Nueva Carrara, Pueblo
Gerona, West of River Sol￿s, Silver River, Highway 9 North, and the international well-known
6Note that our result could also be explained by an initial euphoria and push to better management
immediately after the nationalization that could eventually vanish as time goes by.
5resort of Punta del Este (7,298 inhabitants)7.
Uragua was owned by Aguas de Bilbao, a Spanish water provider. In 2004 Uragua
entered in litigation with OSE because of a breach of contract, following some well publicized
episodes of colored water in Maldonado. Following the 2004 amendment to the Uruguayan
constitution,8 Urugua reached a deal with the Uruguayan government and all Uragua assets
were transferred to OSE by the end of 2005.
Aguas Corrientes El Pinar was created in 1946, six years before the creation of OSE, with
the objectives of fostering land sales in El Pinar area which legally required connections to
water and sewage services. It served less than 1,000 clients until the 1990s, but by the time of
the nationalization it had reached around 5,000 clients due to the rapid development of the
area over the last decade. Interestingly, only 12 persons worked full time in Aguas Corrientes
El Pinar. The connection fee was around USD 200 and the average consumption was USD
10.
Aguas Corrientes el Pinar provided services in El Pinar, but also the adjacent areas of San
Crist￿bal, El Palmar, MØdanos de Solymar, Lomas de Solymar, Autodromo, and Colinas de
Solymar in the department of Canelones. Canelones is the second Department in Uruguay
in terms of population size with 500,000 inhabitants. The population in El Pinar and LomÆs
de Solymar is around 33,000. Aguas Corrientes el Pinar was nationalized in December 2006
and its assets were also transferred to OSE.
The third biggest private company in Uruguay was Aguas de la Costa. It was a
joint-venture between a local company, S.T.A Ingenerios and Benecio S.A., which had around
10% ownership, and the Spanish company Aguas de Barcelona, a subsidiary of Suez Lyonaisse
des Eaux, which owned the rest of the company. Aguas de la Costa signed the concession in
1993 for twenty ￿ve years. The company supplied water and sewage in the wealthier areas of
La Barra, Manantiales and JosØ Ignacio, which is next to Punta del Este. This area is to the
east of the Maldonado stream. The company had around 3,100 customers and the connection
fee for water and sewage was USD 2,000 and USD 1,000 for water only. A special rate for
7We take all year around population and not the tourist population, which can reach hundreds of
thousands during the summer.
8The amendment that went through a referendum declared water as being part of the public domain.
6low income households was available. The average water consumption ranged between USD
40 and USD 100. After an agreement with the government, the company left the country in
2005. Aguas de la Costa assets were transferred to OSE in 2005.
Figure 1 provides a map of Uruguay and Figure 2 provides maps of Canelones and
Maldonado to better understand the location of the privately-owned water companies. The
left panel of Figure 2 shows the department of Canelones by judicial section. The judicial
section 19 in Canelones was served principally by Aguas Corrientes el Pinar. The rest of the
judicial sections of Canelones were operated by the publicly-owned OSE. The right panel of
Figure 2 shows the map of the Department of Maldonado by judicial section. The judicial
sections 1,2, 3 and 5 were served by Uragua. The judicial section 6 was operated by Aguas
de la Costa. Finally, judicial section 4, which contains the city of Aigua, was not privatized
and was controlled by the public company OSE.
It is clear that Maldonado was particularly hit by the nationalization reversal. At the
turn of the century, the only city in Maldonado served by the publicly-owned OSE was Aigua
with 2,676 inhabitants. By 2006, OSE was the only provider of water services in Maldonado.
Table 1 shows the evolution of some indicators of the public company OSE between
2002 and 2006. For instance, the number of employees did not su⁄er a substantial
modi￿cation after nationalization. As it is expected, the volume of water produced grew
after nationalization since the water service coverage increased. Moreover, the population
served with sewerage rose from 531,300 in 2004 to 729,100 in 2006. Total gross ￿xed assets
(including work in progress) increased sharply (around 38%) between 2004 and 2006. This
partly includes acquisitions of the private companies, but also new infrastructure investments
through a sanitation project supported by the World Bank after nationalization. Finally,
contrary to what could have been expected, average prices charged by OSE increased after
nationalization. The ￿xed charge per month for water and wastewater services for residential
customers increased by approximately USD 1 after nationalization. Connection fees also
increased.
73 Methodology
The ideal methodology to assess the impact of privatization (nationalization) on di⁄erent
outcomes would be an experiment involving a random assignments to treated and non-treated
individuals. That is, we would have cities which are randomly chosen to be privatized, usually
called the ￿treatment group￿and other which are not (the ￿control group￿ ). In our case
privatization was not carried out at random and therefore we need to ￿nd out an alternative
methodology which mimics as best as possible a natural experiment. We followed the existing
literature and adopt a quasi-experimental di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence methodology.9
The identi￿cation strategy we followed is similar to the one in Galiani et al. (2005)
in where they search for systematic di⁄erences in changes in child mortality rates between
regions that have privatized and those that have not changed the ownership structure of
water companies using a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach.10
Selection bias due to cherry-picking at the moment of privatization is an issue in
this setup, that they address through di⁄erent methods. In our case, given that the
nationalization was imposed on all private ￿rms allows us to circumvent this problem, as
long as the determinants of privatization are not serially correlated. In the case of Uruguay￿ s
nationalization of water companies in 2005-2006, the condition seems to be satis￿ed as
some of the private companies in Canelones were funded as early as 1946, and it is therefore
unlikely that the determinants of ￿privatization￿at that time are correlated with the decision
to nationalize all water companies in 2005-2006.
On the other hand, in Maldonado the privatization episode was more recent. Aguas de
la Costa and Uragua were originally privatized in 1993 and 2000 respectively. In that sense,
one can argue that there was selection in the privatization decision at the time. If this latter
argument applies, these endogenous determinants of privatization may also be biasing the
estimates of the impact of nationalization on the outcome variable.
9For a randomized experiment of spring water cleaning in rural Kenya, see Kremer, Leino, Miguel and
Zane, (2009).
10Lee et al. (1997) show that this reduced form approach may downward bias the e⁄ects of treatment as
households adjust their behavior to the new environment, and provide an alternative structural approach to
estimate the impact of better quality on health outcomes.
8For example, suppose that the government decide to privatize companies in judicial
districts that were more pro￿table and had better prospects in order to maximize the
short-run ￿nancial bene￿ts from the privatization. If pro￿tability positively a⁄ects
performance over time (i.e., performance is serially correlated) we will observe that
nationalization had led to a better performing water company, but this was just due to
the trend in the performance of water companies in that region. In this context, even
if nationalization adversely a⁄ected performance, estimation might not identify this e⁄ect
because the treatment group includes a disproportionate number of utilities that perform
well.
There are two answers to this. First, as observed in the Data section, privatized and public
water companies in Maldonado had similar trends in performance before the nationalization
of water companies. And in some of the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence speci￿cation we control
for general trends using year ￿xed e⁄ects, as well as jurisdiction-speci￿c trends. Second,
the decision to nationalize water companies was mainly politically as illustrated in Table 2
which shows data from the Electoral Court regarding the water referendum and the national
election of 2004, as well as the department elections in 2005. There is a strong correlation
between support for the water referendum and support for the left wing party. For example,
if we considered the Department of Maldonado, which had two private water providers, we
observe that the referendum was defeated only in cities where the national or department
elections went for right wing parties (Pan de Azœcar, Punta del Este and Aigua). One
therefore suspects that the decision to privatize in the 1990s was also politically and not
performance driven.
Our general econometric model is given by:
yit = ￿Dit + x
0
it￿ + ￿t + ￿i + uit (1)
where yit is the outcome variable in city (or judicial section) i in year t. We consider three
di⁄erent outcome variables: sanitation rates, water quality, and child mortality. The unit
of observation i are cities in the case of sanitation and water quality analysis, and judicial
sections in the case of child mortality. Dit is a dummy variable indicating that the water
9company in city (or judicial section) i in period t is publicly-owned, ￿i is a city (or judicial
section) speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ect, ￿t is a year e⁄ect, xit is a vector of control variables and uit is
a city (or judicial section) time-varying error (distributed independently across department
and time). The regression is structured to capture the e⁄ects of aggregate factors and
department speci￿c responses to aggregate factors.
The parameter of interest is ￿ which measures the casual impact of the type of ownership
(public vs. private) of the water company on water quality. When sanitation rate is the
outcome variable, a positive coe¢ cient will indicate that nationalization of private companies
led to larger sanitation rates conditional on year and city ￿xed e⁄ects, as well as control
variables at the city level. On the other hand, when considering water quality tests (abnormal
levels of microbiological and organoleptic elements) or child mortality rates as the dependent
variable, a positive coe¢ cient implies that nationalization led to a higher number of tests with
abnormal results and more child mortality, again conditional on year and city (or judicial
section) ￿xed e⁄ects, and other control variables at the city (or judicial section) level.
In order to address the problem that di⁄erent departments may have been following
di⁄erent trends before nationalization, we include a city (or judicial section) speci￿c time
trend. This will correct for the fact that nationalization may be correlated across time with
other determinants of our outcome variables that are unrelated to the change in ownership of
water companies. If we do not control for this city (or judicial section) speci￿c time trends,
our estimates may be biased due to a spurious correlation between nationalization of water
companies and the three di⁄erent outcome variables. Formally,
yit = ￿Dit + x
0
it￿ + ￿t + ￿itrend + ￿i + uit (2)
where ￿i trend is a city (judicial section) speci￿c time trend.
Another important issue is that in panel data models observations tend to be correlated
across time within individual city or judicial sections. One possible solution to address the
serial correlation problem is to use robust standard errors clustered at department-section
judicial level. In this context, asymptotic statistical inference depends on the number of
cluster and time periods. A small number of clusters could result in biased (clustered)
10standard errors, tending to underestimate inference precision.
Bertrand, Du￿ o and Mullainthan (2004) analyzed the performance of di⁄erent alternative
solutions to the serial correlation problem: 1) parametric methods, that is, specifying an
autocorrelation structure; 2) block bootstrap; 3) ￿ignoring time series information￿ , that is,
averaging the data before and after treatment; and 4) using an ￿empirical variance-covariance
matrix￿ . Bertrand, et al. ￿nd that the latter perform better than the others, but it does
not work properly with small sample size. Moreover, Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008)
states that block bootstrap work properly with small number of groups.11
In our case, bootstrap clustered standard errors are similar to clustered standard errors
and in most cases the latter method report greater standard errors and in some cases
conventional standard error are larger than the latter. As a conservative criterion, we decided
to report the method with the largest standard errors in each case. Depending on the nature
of the outcome variable: continuous, count or fractional, we will use di⁄erent estimators that
will be discussed in the results section.
4 Data sources and variable construction
We start describing data sources and variable construction for the analysis of the impact of
nationalization on access to water sanitation networks. We then turn to data sources and
variable construction for the study of the impact of nationalization on water quality, and we
￿nally discuss data sources when we use child mortality as the outcome variable.
4.1 Access to sanitation networks
The data regarding the percentage of households with water-sealed toilets connected to
sewer lines are obtained from the annual Uruguayan national household survey, Encuesta
Continua de Hogares (ECH) conducted by the National Statistical O¢ ce of Uruguay,
Instituto Nacional de Estad￿stica (INE). The ECH is the main source of socio-economic
11An alternative solution is to use the method proposed by Bell and McCa⁄rey (2002) ￿bias correction of
clustered standard errors￿ , but unfortunately this approach cannot be applied in a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
set up.
11information about Uruguayan households and their members at the national level. The
surveys were carried out throughout the year with the objective of generating a proper
description of the socio-economic situation of the entire population.
The ECH also includes questions about household living conditions. In particular, the
survey asks whether water-sealed toilets are connected to sewer lines. Hence, we generate
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the household is connected to sewer lines and
0 otherwise. Then, we aggregate the data by city in order to obtain the percentage of
households with sanitation access in each city. We therefore work with panel data by
city from 1986 to 2009. The time-span includes the pre-privatization period in the case of
Maldonado, as the two privatizations in Maldonado occured in 1993 and 2000 as discussed
earlier.
The ECH survey is only representative at the Department level or at the city level for
largest cities in terms of population. Therefore, and to have a representative sample, we keep
only capital cities of the di⁄erent Departments and other big cities in our sample. We have a
total of 35 cities, three in the treatment group (Maldonado, Pan de Azœcar and San Carlos)
and 32 in the control group: Artigas, Bella Uni￿n, Canelones, Carmelo, Colonia, Dolores,
Durazno, Florida, Fray Bentos, Lascano, Libertad, Melo, Mercedes, Minas, Montevideo, Paso
de los Toros, Paysandœ, Periferia Canelones, Rivera, Rocha, Rosario, R￿o Branco, Salto, San
JosØ de Mayo, San Ram￿n, Santa Luc￿a, Sarand￿ del Y￿, Sarand￿ Grande, Tacuaremb￿,
Tranqueras, Treinta y Tres, Trinidad and Young.
Due to the fact that there are some selected cities which were not surveyed in some years
(mainly in the ECH older edition), we have an unbalanced panel which could possibly imply
panel attrition bias. For instance, in the treatment group, of the total 24 time periods,
Pan de Azœcar appears 15 times and San Carlos 18 times. In the control group, we have
observations for Lascano in 10 of the 24 time periods, and for Bella Uni￿n, Libertad and
Rosario in 12 years, Santa Luc￿a in 15 years, Carmelo, Dolores, Paso de los Toros, R￿o
Branco, San Ram￿n, Sarand￿ del Y￿ and Sarand￿ Grande in 17 years, and Young in 18 years.
So, we have a total of 735 observations12. Some cities started to appear in the ECH because
12There are 35 cities. We have 21 cities times 24 (1986-2009 period) which represent 504 observations. In
addition, we have 1 x 10 + 3 x 12 + 2 x 15 + 7 x 17 + 2 x 18 = 231 observations.
12of their rapid growth in terms of population and therefore we checked the robustness of
results to a smaller sub-sample in terms of time-span: 1993-2009.
The are two observations that need to be made. First, control cities largely exceed
treatment cities and hence we will also estimate our model reducing the number of controls
to only capital cities. The sanitation data of each capital city are available in every year
of the whole period, so in this case panel attrition problems are potentially solved. Second,
since we lose observation as we drop cities, small sample bias could arise. Thus, this could
be seen as a trade-o⁄ between small sample bias and possible panel attrition bias, which
provides some robustness checks to our results.
In Figure 3, we present the evolution of the average sanitation rate of the 35 cities.
Overall, we can see that it has an upward trend and in recent years it grows at a faster pace
which leaves sanitation above its trend level. In the econometric analysis we will include
general trends in network evacuation rates to control for this. Note that the water utilities
of Maldonado, Pan de Azœcar and San Carlos belonged to the private company Uragua
between 2000 and 2005. Thus, we have for those cities a pre-privatized period 1986-1999,
in where water utilities were serviced by OSE the public company, and the period after
nationalization, 2006-2009, when the water utilities returned to OSE.
Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of the average sanitation rate for treated (solid line)
and non-treated cities (dash line). There seems to be a higher variance for the treatment
group, but before privatization the trend in network evacuation rates across the treatment
group and the control group were similar, especially between 1997 and 2000, the period
immediately before privatization. During the privatization period between 2000 and 2006,
the rate of growth in sanitation access in treated cities seemed to accelerate relative to
non-treated cities. And this trend accelerates again after nationalization in 2006.
Figure 5 plots the evolution of sanitation rates for each city belonging to the treatment
group (Maldonado, Pan de Azœcar and San Carlos), as well as Ciudad de la Costa, which
used to be provided by the private-owned company Aguas Corrientes El Pinar. We observe
some interesting variability in this indicator of performance. Access to the sanitation network
in Ciudad de la Costa was nearly zero until 2005, when the nationalization process begun
13and after that, we observe an upward trend. Ciudad de la Costa was not included in the
sample because, as we can see in Figure 5, its sanitation rate is far from the average of the
rest of the cities of the treatment group (and from the overall average) and thus it could
interfere in the estimation of a reliable counterfactual.
Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics by treatment and control groups. Overall,
the treatment and control group present similar characteristics on average. Nevertheless,
the treatment group has a smaller proportion of poor and extremely poor inhabitants, which
should be captured by our city speci￿c e⁄ects in the econometric analysis. Indeed, using a
di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence method, we will try to answer whether the higher level of access to the
sanitation network observed in the treatment group after nationalization can be attributable
to a causal e⁄ect. This evolution could be following a trend and thus in some speci￿cations
we include time trend by city as a way to check if our results are robust.
4.2 Water quality tests
Data on water quality tests comes from the energy and water services regulator (URSEA). In
2004, URSEA jointly with the chemistry department of University of La Repœblica created
a water quality unit (UAA) which is in charge of monitoring the water supply system in
the whole country, according to the guidelines of the World Health Organization. This unit
carries out several water tests (in the distribution network) to measure the water quality
provided to consumers.
Our units of observation are cities from Uruguay￿ s 19 Departments. We have data for
the period 2004-2009 but some observations are missing for some of the cities. As treatment
cities we have Maldonado, Pan de Azœcar, PiriÆpolis, Punta Ballena, Punta del Este and
San Carlos. And as control cities: Artigas, Canelones, Colonia, Dolores, Durazno, Florida,
Fray Bentos, La Paloma, La Paz, Las Piedras, Melo, Mercedes, Minas, Montevideo, Pando,
Paysandœ, Progreso, Rivera, Rocha, Salto, San JosØ, Atlantida, Tacuaremb￿, Toledo, Treinta
y Tres and Trinidad.
We have data for two di⁄erent microbiological tests and two organoleptic tests, which we
will use as outcome variables because of their importance in terms of direct and indirect
14negative e⁄ects on health. The two microbiological tests are for fecal coliforms, and
pseudomonas aeruginosa. The two organoleptic tests are ph and cloudiness tests.
The ￿rst test indicates whether the fecal coliforms exceed the accepted limit value.
The second test indicates whether pseudomononas aeruginosa is present. In the case of
organolpetic tests, the UAA reports the observed value. In the case of ph tests, the upper
limit is 8 mg/Land, and higher levels are considered abnormal. The upper limit in the
cloudiness test is 5, so a result greater or equal to this value represents a high level of
cloudiness in the water, which could indirectly a⁄ect health via a higher likelihood of bacteria
formation and a reduction in the quantity consumed of water.
The outcome variable that captures abnormal levels of microbiological or organoleptic
substances is constructed as follows. For each test we generate a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if the test is above the accepted limit and zero otherwise. We then sum these four
binary variables to create a count variable that measures the number of tests that showed
abnormal levels in each city.
One possible drawback of this data is that tests have become better and more precise
over time, allowing to detect more often abnormal levels of substances. This could bias our
estimates, as we would observe a deterioration of the water quality throughout the period due
to better testing techniques, rather than water quality. This is addressed in our econometric
framework by the use of year ￿xed e⁄ects as control variables.
Figure 6 plots the evolution of the average of this count variable for treatment and
control groups. We actually observe initially a downward trend in both treated and control
groups until nationalization. And the average of the treated group declines faster. After
nationalization, the treatment group experience almost no detection in abnormal levels until
2008, whereas the control group had a slight increase in the detection of abnormal levels.
From 2008 there is an increase in the detection in both the treatment and the control group.
This could be explained by the increase in the detection capacity as mentioned above.
In Table 4, we provide some descriptive statistics by treatment and control group. Overall,
and as we previously observed in the ￿gures, the treatment group presents a better level of
quality if we consider the entire period.
154.3 Child mortality
The data on child mortality by judicial section and cause of death come from the
Ministry of Public Health (Direcci￿n General de la Salud-Departamento de Informaci￿n
Poblacional-Estad￿sticas Vitales). An important characteristic of Uruguay￿ s health
infrastructure is that it tends to be concentrated in its capital: Montevideo. Children￿ s
health is no exception, and when children from all over the country need serious care, they are
sent to the Pereira Rossell in Montevideo, which is the largest children hospital in Uruguay.
If the child eventually dies in the Pereira Rossell, public mortality statistics will report this
death as occurring in Montevideo. In order to avoid this bias we asked the Ministry of Public
Health to provide us with information regarding the mother￿ s residence by judicial section,
rather than the location of the child￿ s death.
Another interesting aspect of the dataset is that it contains detailed information on
the causes of death. Galiani et al. (2005) lump together all death caused by infectious
and parasite diseases and perinatal death as being water-related. Our dataset includes
information taken from the death certi￿cate signed by the Judicial O¢ cer, which identi￿es
the cause of death in great detail. This allows us to more precisely identify whether the
type of infectious disease and exclude child deaths which were caused by infectious diseases
that are not water-related.13 This could be done with relatively more precision in the case
of non-perinatal deaths, i.e., those that occur between 5 weeks and 1 year old. In the case
of perinatal deaths, which occur within the ￿rst 4 weeks it is often di¢ cult to identify the
exact cause of death.
The evolution of total, perinatal, and non-perinatal child mortality in Uruguay around
the nationalization period is shown in Figure 7.14 Child mortality experienced a downward
trend between 2003 and 2006, with an important increase in 2007, followed by a decline in
2008 and 2009, which leaves child mortality below its trend level. It is interesting to note
13We include the following causes of death as being water-related: myotonic disorders, bacterial sepsis
of newborn, unspeci￿ed, necrotizing enterocolitis fetus and necrotizing enterocolitis of the new birth
septicemia, unspeci￿ed, meningitis, unspeci￿ed encephalitis, myelitis and encephalomyelitis, unspeci￿ed,
bacterial meningitis, unspeci￿ed, congenital viral hepatitis, sepsis of new birth by other staphylococcus, and
other unspeci￿ed, septicemia due to candida.
14Figures for Uruguay are approximated by ￿gures for the departments of Canelones, Lavalleja, Maldonado
and Rocha, which represent our choice of treatment and control groups.
16that during all this period the average GDP growth was 6.3% and ranged from 2.2% in 2003
to 11.8% in 2004.
Figure 8 shows the evolution of child mortality rates by water-related diseases for treated
and control groups separating the regions a⁄ected by the privatization in Canelones and
Maldonado of Lavalleja and Rocha (and we also include the part of Canelones which
always belonged to the public company). In both cases, we observe a downward trend
through most of the period. But there are some interesting di⁄erences before and after
nationalization: 1) before nationalization water-related child mortality has a similar trend
across the treatment and control Departments, but the treatment group tends to have a
higher level of water-related child mortality; 2) after nationalization water-related child
mortality declines faster in the treatment group at least until 2009, and the level of child
mortality in the treatment group is generally below the level of water-related child mortality
in the control group. This fact could be attributable to a causal e⁄ect.
In the econometric analysis we work with a panel data at the judicial section level.
Our control group are the neighboring judicial districts in Canelones and Maldonado. More
precisely, the judicial sections with private water companies located in Maldonado are judicial
sections 1 to 3, 5 and 6. We merge judicial sections 3 and 5 because of representativeness
of judicial section 3 in terms of population. In Canelones judicial section 19 is subject to
treatment. As control groups we will use neighboring judicial sections that did not privatize:
judicial section 4 in Maldonado, and judicial sections 1 to 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17 and 18 in
Canelones. We also use as control judicial section 1 in Maldonado￿ s neighboring Department
of Lavalleja and judicial sections 1, 3, 4 and 5 in Maldonado￿ s neighboring Department of
Rocha. In total, we have 25 judicial sections in our analysis from 2003 to 2009. Therefore,
the total number of observation is 175. In Table 5, we present descriptive statistics.
5 Results
We start discussing the results of the estimation of equations (1) and (2) when access to
sanitation rates is the outcome variable. We then turn to the estimates obtained when water
17quality is the outcome variable, and we conclude this section with the results obtained when
child mortality is used as the outcome variable.
5.1 Access to sanitation networks
We estimate equations (1) and (2) for di⁄erent subsamples, with and without control
variables. Because the left-hand-side variable is a fractional variable (percent of households
with water-sealed toilets connected to sewer lines) we used a Papke and Wooldridge (2006)
estimator. Control variables include average completed years of education of the household
head and average real per capita household income at the city level, as well as accumulated
precipitations at the department level. We expect the three control variables to be positively
correlated with network evacuation rates.
Table 6 presents the results. In almost all subsamples, there is a positive and statistically
signi￿cant impact of public ownership on sanitation rates. A positive e⁄ect means that
the presence of a public provider (i.e., nationalization) led to a higher access to sanitation
networks. The coe¢ cient which captures the causal impact is on average 0.08, which means
that nationalization led to an 8% increase in access to sanitation networks.
In order to check whether the increase in access to sanitation networks occurred where we
expect it, i.e., among poor households, we aggregate the data at the city level using only the
lower 25th household income percentile in one case and the higher 25th in the other. Table
7 and Table 8 provide estimates for these two sub-samples. As expected, in the ￿rst case we
found a positive, large and statistically signi￿cant impact of private ownership on sanitation
rate for all sub-samples. The point estimate is larger than the one reported in Table 6. Access
to sanitation networks for those at the bottom of the income distribution increased by 15%
on average as a result of nationalization. In the case of rich households, we found a positive
and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects but only for some speci￿c sub-samples. Moreover, the
coe¢ cient is always statistically smaller than the coe¢ cient for poor households. In sum,
nationalization has a positive impact on access to sanitation networks, and this e⁄ect is
stronger for poor households.15
15We also tried these regression for households above and below the poverty line. The results, which are
18Because serial correlation may be an issue in this di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence setup, we
parametrically model the serial correlation of the error term as a ￿rst autoregressive process
AR(1). We use di⁄erent estimation methods which imply di⁄erent assumptions. Results
are reported in Table 9. In the ￿rst column, we report pool feasible generalized least
squares estimates, allowing the error term to be correlated over cities, i.e., we allow for error
correlation across panels or usually called ￿spatial correlation￿ . In the second column, error
correlation across individuals is assumed to be identically and independently distributed. In
the third column, we use the within estimator to estimate ￿xed e⁄ects, and in the last column
we provide estimates using Driscoll and Kraay method to obtain Newey West type standard
errors, which allow error autocorrelation of the general form. We use the sub-sample, which
only includes capital cities apart from Montevideo. Again, in all cases there is a positive
impact of nationalization on access to network sanitation.
This increase in sanitation access is consistent with the fact that a USD 50 million loan
was obtained from the World Bank for an OSE project on sanitation and residual treatment
after nationalization of the private companies.16 In addition, OSE has published on its
website that after nationalization work related to sanitation improvements, which has been
stopped since 2002, restarted again. Sanitation projects in Ciudad de la Costa, Punta del
Este and Maldonado, where private companies were located became priority in OSE￿ s agenda.
5.2 Water quality tests
The outcome variable is the count of tests that reported an abnormal level of microbiological
or organolpectic substances. This type of right-hand-side variables requires an appropriate
estimator. We will use a Poisson and a Negative Binomial estimator to take into account
available upon request, are similar.
16The World Bank has ￿nancially supported Uruguay in the development of the water and sanitation
services with 3 investment loans in di⁄erent time periods: 1) Water Supply Rehabilitation project (1988-1999)
- USD 22.3 million; 2) OSE Modernization and Systems Rehabilitation project, APL-1 (2000-2007) ￿USD
27 million; 3) OSE Modernization and Systems Rehabilitation project, APL-2 (ongoing since 2007) ￿USD 50
million. Additionally, there were other loans which focus on technical support: Public Services Modernization
Technical Assistance project (2001-2008) ￿ USD 6 million. These objective of these loans were to help
Uruguay carry out investments in the water sector infrastructure, improving e¢ ciency and coverage of the
water supply and sanitation service.
19over-dispersion in water tests (a non-constant ratio of variance over conditional mean).
Because there is a large number of zeros in the data (see Table 4) we also perform a Vuong
test which indicated that the zero-in￿ ated Poisson was the appropriate model.
We used as control variables accumulated precipitations, minimum temperature and
average temperature at the department level. We expect precipitation to be positively
correlated with the number of abnormal quality tests, since a high level of precipitations
is likely to negatively a⁄ect the functioning of the water network, making water tests more
prone to detecting higher levels of undesired substances. Low temperature could increase
the likelihood of failure of the network distribution system and a high average temperature
could contribute to the reproduction of bacterium like coliforms, so we expect a negative
coe¢ cient on the former and a positive coe¢ cient on the latter.
Table 10 reports the estimates with and without control variables. The ￿rst two columns
provide the zero-in￿ ated Poisson estimates, and the last two columns the zero-in￿ ated
Negative Binomial estimates. Control variables have the expected signs across both
speci￿cations, but none of the variables is statistically signi￿cant. The public provision of
water services is always negatively associated with abnormal levels of undesired substances
in water quality tests, and the impact is statistically signi￿cant at the 10 percent level.
It is also very large, with a reduction of 0.7 tests per city showing abnormal levels after
nationalization. Thus, results suggests that water quality improved with nationalization.
5.3 Child mortality
Because child mortality by water-related diseases is a count variable, we address the count
nature of the data using either a Poisson, or a Negative Binomial estimator to control for
over-dispersion in child mortality (a non-constant ratio of variance over conditional mean),
when measurement error is likely to be di⁄erent in judicial districts with di⁄erent levels
of child mortality. There is also a large number of judicial districts that report no child
mortality throughout the period and therefore we used a Vuong test to see whether a
Poisson or a zero-in￿ ated Poisson model is the appropriate estimator. The results of the
Vuong tests suggest that the standard Poisson model is the adequate estimator in spite of
20the large presence of zeroes. We also provide estimates using child mortality rates as the
dependent variable (instead of the count in child mortality). Because child mortality rates
(child mortality over the number of births) are a fractional variable we used Papke and
Wooldrige (1996) correction.17
We used as control variables average completed years of education, average household
income per capita and the unemployment rate at the judicial section level, as well as annual
accumulated precipitations and average minimum temperatures at the department level.
The ￿rst three variables are expected to be correlated with child mortality. Higher income
and education will be negatively correlated with child mortality, as they will help households
avoid diseases that may lead to the death of a child. On the other hand, higher levels of
unemployment (conditional on income and education) may tend to positively a⁄ect child
mortality through the additional stress and tension it imposes on households. A high level
of accumulated precipitation is associated with ￿ oods which a⁄ect children￿ s health, and
therefore is expected to be positively correlated with child morality. The variable average
minimum temperature is expected to be negatively correlated with child mortality since
higher minimum temperatures could be linked with a less risky environment in terms of
illnesses.
The results of di⁄erent panel estimation with and without control variables are provided
in Table 11. The ￿rst six columns present results using Canelones and Maldonado as the
treatment group, and the last six columns results are for Maldonado only. In each case,
results are ￿rst given for the Poisson estimator, then the negative Binomial estimator and
￿nally for the Papke and Wooldridge (1996) fractional response estimator.
The estimated coe¢ cients capturing the impact of having a public water provider on child
mortality are generally negative, but they are statistically signi￿cant only for the Papke and
Wooldridge estimates, and only when we do not use control variables. There are no major
di⁄erences between the estimates obtained when using only Maldonado as the treatment
group, and Maldonado and Canelones judicial districts as the treatment group.
In sum, the nationalization of water services does not seem to have had an important
17Note that in the Poisson and Negative Binomial estimation we also control for the total number of births
in each judicial district, and impose a coe¢ cient equal to 1.
21impact on water-related child mortality. But, if anything, nationalization has led to a
reduction, not an increase, in child mortality, as could have been expected from earlier
papers. Note that the lack of statistical signi￿cance of some of the results on water-related
child mortality could be partly explained by the low numbers of water-related child deaths
in Uruguay as reported in Table 5.
6 Conclusions
The question of market versus government failures in the provision of water services is
complex, and unlikely to be answered without empirical evidence. In this paper we examine
the impact of nationalization of water services on access to network and quality of water,
as well as a health outcome: child mortality. Contrary to most of the existing literature
we identify the impact not through the privatization of public ￿rms, but rather through
the nationalization of private ￿rms. This is an interesting advantage of our case study
because nationalization su⁄ers less than privatization from selection bias, i.e., the fact that
governments and private ￿rms select the public companies that should be privatized. In the
case of the nationalization of water services in Uruguay, all existing private companies were
nationalized, which help us identify the impact of the reform on the quality of the service
provided without having to worry about ￿rms or governments choosing the best (or the
worst) ￿rms for privatization.
Several outcomes variables were used: access to sewage network, water quality and
water-related child mortality. Using di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimators, we found that
Uruguay￿ s nationalization of water services in 2006 led to an improvement in access to the
sewage network, as well as an improvement in water quality. We also found evidence of a
decline in water-related child mortality, but this latter e⁄ect tends not to be statistically
signi￿cant.
These results contrast with existing evidence for privatization of water services in
other Latin American countries, which tend to ￿nd that privatization led to a decline in
child mortality, and an increase in water access and quality. Future research should try
22to disentangle the determinants of these two di⁄erent outcomes to help understand why
privatization did not have the expected impact in Uruguay.
Potential explanations for these di⁄erences may lay on the type of regulations at the time
of privatization or nationalization (investment requested, universal services), the functioning
of regulatory bodies, or badly designed contracts and bidding processes, etc. A detailed
examination of these di⁄erences can help understand what works and what does not work in
terms of water privatization. Also di⁄erences in the functioning of public companies (external
funding, composition of the board of directors, etc) could help explain why in some countries
public providers of water services seem to do better than in other countries.
Finally, the results in this paper suggest that the focus on private versus public ownership
of natural monopolies such as water providers may be misleading. The institutional
environment under which the natural monopoly operates may be much more important.
In Uruguay, at least, the public operator provided a service of equal if not better quality
than the one previously provided by private ￿rms.
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Map of Uruguay and treated jurisdictions
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Map of treated jurisdictions
Canelones Maldonado
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Impact of nationalization on access to sewage network controlling for AR(1) disturbancesa
Variables Pooled Pooled Within Within
FGLS OLS Estimator Estimator
D-K
Public Water Provider 0.067*** 0.104*** 0.097*** 0.115***
(0.019) (0.032) (0.033) (0.030)
Education 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.019** 0.031**
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
(log) Household per Capita Income 0.154*** 0.156*** 0.161*** 0.133***
(0.013) (0.035) (0.035) (0.038)
(log) Accumulated Precipitations 0.012* 0.029 0.023 0.043*
(0.007) (0.019) (0.016) (0.022)
Observations 432 432 414 432
AR(1) 0.366 0.270 0.397 -
Sample Period 1986-2009
aAll columns report estimates using panel data estimators controlling for AR(1) disturbances. Marginal
e⁄ects reported and robust standard errors clustered at city level reported in parentheses. All models include
individual and year e⁄ects, as well as time trends by city. Treatment Units: Maldonado; Control Units:
Artigas, Canelones, Colonia, Durazno, Florida, Fray Bentos, Melo, Mercedes, Minas, Paysandœ, Rivera,
Rocha, Salto, San JosØ de Mayo, Tacuaremb￿, Treinta y Tres and Trinidad. * stands for signi￿cance at the
10% level; ** stands for signi￿cance at the 5% level; *** stands for signi￿cance at 1% level.
43Table 10
Impact of nationalization on water qualitya (abnormal levels of microbiological elements)
Poisson Negative Binomial
Variables (1) (2) (1) (2)
Public water provider -0.650* -0.693* -0.650* -0.694*
(0.358) (0.367) (0.355) (0.384)
Precipitations 0.381 0.381
(0.381) (0.386)
Minimum temperature -0.098 -0.098
(0.121) (0.122)
Average temperature 0.001 0.001
(0.152) (0.152)
Individual E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 182 182 182 182
Log Likelihood -101.316 -100.954 -101.316 -100.954
Sample 2004 - 2009
aAll columns report estimates using a zero in￿ ated model. Marginal e⁄ects reported and robust standard
errors clustered at city level reported in parentheses. All models include individual and year e⁄ects. Vuong
tests indicated that the zero in￿ ated models are appropriate. * stands for signi￿cance at the 10% level; **
stands for signi￿cance at the 5% level; *** stands for signi￿cance at 1% level.
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